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Professors of international intellectual property law, through their 
undersigned counsel, respectfully move for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in 
the above-captioned action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a).  
The proposed brief has been tendered herewith.  Neither Appellant nor Appellee 
oppose the filing of the brief. 
As detailed in the “Interest of Amici Curiae” section of the tendered brief, 
the movants are six professors of international property law, who have a particular 
interest in ensuring that the development of patent law principles serve the public 
interest.  Movants comprise: 
 Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law 
 Ann Bartow, University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law 
 Michael A. Carrier, Rutgers Law School 
 Christa Laser, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law 
 Joshua D. Sarnoff, DePaul University College of Law 
 Peter K. Yu, Texas A&M University School of Law 
Movants are interested in the present action because it implicates important matters 
at the intersection of patent and contract law, as well as issues of international 
comity and reciprocity.  The tendered brief seeks to draw to the Court’s attention 
historical, practical, and policy matters that bear on the arguments made by the 
parties, including inefficiencies in current methods of adjudicating disputes 
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regarding licensing of standards-essential patents, and the development and 
contemporary use of the international anti-suit injunction in such actions.   
Movants are particularly suited to provide the Court with a unique and 
valuable perspective on the issues in this action because they have contributed 
extensive research and scholarship pertaining to such matters.  Indeed, certain of 
movants have also provided their views as amicus curiae in other litigation 
involving these and related topics concerning standards-essential patents.1  
Accordingly, the tendered brief is a useful contribution of valuable information for 
this Court.  Leave to file the brief should be granted. 
 
 
Dated:  March 1, 2021             Respectfully submitted,   
/s/  Indranil Mukerji 
Indranil Mukerji 
Stephen A. Marshall 
Devon W. Edwards 
WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 
1875 K Street NW 
Washington, DC 20006-1238 
(202) 303-1000 
 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
         
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Jorge Contreras In Support of 
Appellee and Affirmance, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 19-16122 (9th Cir.). 
Case: 21-1565      Document: 18-1     Page: 3     Filed: 03/01/2021 (3 of 40)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802235
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of March, 2021, I caused copies of the 
foregoing Motion for Leave to File Brief of International Intellectual Property Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party to be served by electronic 
means via the Court’s CM/ECF system on all counsel registered to receive 
electronic notices. 
 




Case: 21-1565      Document: 18-1     Page: 4     Filed: 03/01/2021 (4 of 40)





United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit 
 
ERICSSON INC., AND TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON 
 Plaintiff-Appellee,  
– v. – 
SAMSUNG ELECS. CO, LTD., SAMSUNG ELECS. AMERICA, INC., AND 
SAMSUNG RESEARCH AMERICA 
Defendant-Appellant. 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Eastern District of Texas, No. 2:20-cv-380-JRG,  
Honorable J. Rodney Gilstrap, Chief District Judge  
 
BRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
LAW PROFESSORS AS AMICI CURIAE IN  
SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY 
 
Indranil Mukerji 
Stephen A. Marshall 
Devon W. Edwards 
WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 
1875 K Street NW 
Washington, DC 20006-1238 
(202) 303-1000 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
March 1, 2021 
Case: 21-1565      Document: 18-2     Page: 1     Filed: 03/01/2021 (5 of 40)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802235
i 
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST 
Counsel for amici curiae certify the following: 
1. The full name of all entities represented by us are:  
 
Jorge L. Contreras, Ann Bartow, Michael A. Carrier, Christa Laser, Joshua 
D. Sarnoff, Peter K. Yu. 
 




3.  All parent corporations for the entities and any publicly held companies 




4. All law firms, partners, and associates that appeared for the entities in 
the originating court or agency or are expected to appear in this court for the 
entities:  
 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Indranil Mukerji, Stephen A. Marshall, 
Devon W. Edwards. 
 
5. The title and number of any case known to be pending in this court or 
any other court or agency that will directly affect or be directly affected by 
this court’s decision in the pending appeal:   
 
The Court’s decision in the pending appeal may affect Samsung Electronics 
Co., Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, (2020) E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 
743, currently pending in the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court, Hubei 
Province in the Republic of China. 
 
6.  Any information required under Fed. R. App. P.26.1(b) (organizational 




Case: 21-1565      Document: 18-2     Page: 2     Filed: 03/01/2021 (6 of 40)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802235
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................................... 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 2 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 7 
I.  LICENSING OF STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS IS 
NECESSARY FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY .......................................... 8 
A.  With Few Benchmarks for FRAND Rates, SEP Disputes Often 
Require Sprawling, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation ............................ 10 
B.  Courts Have Increasingly Issued ASIs in FRAND Cases to 
Avoid Duplicative Litigation .............................................................. 12 
II.  THE DISTRICT COURT’S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS 
COUNTER TO PUBLIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMITY ........................................................................................................ 16 
A.  The Chinese Court’s ASI Appropriately Protected Its 
Jurisdiction to Resolve a Global Dispute ............................................ 17 
1.  The Chinese Action Is Dispositive of the Claims in the 
U.S. Litigation ........................................................................... 18 
2.  The ASI Satisfies at Least One Unterweser Factor .................. 22 
3.  The ASI Has a Tolerable Impact on Comity—But the 
AASI Does Not ......................................................................... 25 
B.  The District Court’s AASI May Itself Operate as an ASI, 
Preventing the Chinese Court from Adjudicating Its Case ................. 27 
III.  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 29 
Case: 21-1565      Document: 18-2     Page: 3     Filed: 03/01/2021 (7 of 40)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802235
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page(s) 
Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 
No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 WL 3966944 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2017) ............22, 28, 29 
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 
446 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2006) ...........................................................................13, 14, 18, 22, 25 
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 
773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................9, 28 
Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 
86 F. 984 (C.C.S.D. 1898) .......................................................................................................13 
Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
No.3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 WL 1784065 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) .............15, 25, 26, 28 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 
696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................................................9, 15, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 
871 F.Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872 .........................................22, 23 
TCL Comm’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonakietbolaget LM Ericsson, 
943 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019)............................................................................................9, 12 
TCL Comm’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 
No. 2:15-cv-2370-JVS, 2018 WL 4488286 (C.D. Cal. Sep.14, 2018)  ...................................20 
In re Unterweser Reederei, 
428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) .....................................................................13, 14, 18, 22, 23, 25 
Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., 
No. 14-cv-4988-LAK, 2015 WL 3498634 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 3, 2015) ...........................11, 15, 26 
Statutes 
35 U.S.C. § 284 ..............................................................................................................................21 
35 U.S.C. § 285 ..............................................................................................................................21 
Other Authorities 
George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 
28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589 (1990) ................................................................................13 
Case: 21-1565      Document: 18-2     Page: 4     Filed: 03/01/2021 (8 of 40)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802235
iv 
Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential 
Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701 (2019) ..............................................................................7, 11 
Jorge L. Contreras, It’s Anti-Suit Injunctions All the Way Down: The Strange New 
Realities of International Litigation over Standards-Essential Patents, 26(4) 
IP LITIGATOR 1, 7 (2020)  ..........................................................................................................6 
Jorge L. Contreras, The New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-Suit 
Injunctions and the Global Race to the Bottom In Disputes Over Standards-
Essential Patents, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 251 (2019) ............................................10, 14, 26 
Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents using 
Declarations of Standard-Essential Patents, 27 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 
504 (2018) ..............................................................................................................................8, 9 
Yang Yu and Jorge L. Contreras, Will China’s New Anti-Suit Injunctions Shift the 
Balance of Global FRAND Litigation?, UNIV. UTAH COLL. OF L. RES. PAPER 
NO. 403 (2020) .........................................................................................................................22 
 
 
Case: 21-1565      Document: 18-2     Page: 5     Filed: 03/01/2021 (9 of 40)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802235
1 
 Six professors of international intellectual property law submit this brief as 
amici curiae pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 29 and Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 29.  This brief argues that the District Court’s preliminary injunction 
should be reversed or vacated. 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae are the following six professors of international intellectual 
property law:   
 Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law 
 Ann Bartow, University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law 
 Michael A. Carrier, Rutgers Law School 
 Christa Laser, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law 
 Joshua D. Sarnoff, DePaul University College of Law 
 Peter K. Yu, Texas A&M University School of Law 
Amici have no personal interest in the outcome of this case, but do have a 
professional interest in ensuring that the law develops in a way that serves the 
public interest.  This brief is filed on behalf of amici, and not on behalf of their 
academic institutions.  This brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel 
to either party in this action, and no party, party’s counsel, or any other person has 
contributed financial resources intended to fund the preparation or submission of 
this brief.   
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This brief seeks to draw to the Court’s attention historical, practical, and 
policy matters pertaining to technical standardization and dispute resolution that 
bear on the arguments made on appeal by Samsung and Ericsson, including by 
providing context on the use of anti-suit injunctions (ASIs) and anti-anti-suit 
injunctions (AASIs) in litigation involving global portfolios of standards-essential 
patents (SEPs) that are encumbered by “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” 
(FRAND) licensing commitments. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Technology knows no national boundaries.  A user expects her laptop or 
smartphone to connect to a wireless network in Europe or Asia just as easily as it 
would in the United States.  That interoperability is made possible through the 
existence of worldwide technical standards, like Wi-Fi and LTE.  The present 
appeal highlights a fundamental disconnect between that technical reality, on the 
one hand, and the international jurisdictional conflicts that have come to 
characterize this industry.    
The parties here are corporations headquartered at opposite ends of the earth, 
in Sweden and South Korea, and make devices that are used worldwide.  Neither 
they, nor any other manufacturer, would be able to compete globally without the 
interoperability provided by the many technical standards embodied in those 
devices.  Yet, those global standards rest on tens of thousands of national patents, 
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many of which patent holders commit to license on FRAND terms.  When those 
patents are asserted at a national level, particularly when accompanied by 
contractual disputes over compliance with FRAND licensing commitments, the 
inevitable result is redundant and duplicative proceedings in jurisdictions 
throughout the world.  That state of affairs generates uncertainty for manufacturers 
as to the availability and cost of implementing the subject standards into products, 
and for scientists and engineers seeking to advance them through research and 
development.   
There is no forum that conclusively holds sole jurisdiction over global 
interoperability standards or related patent disputes.  Consequently, litigants have 
searched for procedural mechanisms that can provide the certainty of 
comprehensive resolution and avoid inconsistent results across national courts.  
One such mechanism, the anti-suit injunction (ASI), has become increasingly 
attractive to FRAND litigants.  The ASI, a centuries-old procedure, avoids 
multijurisdictional litigation and promotes judicial efficiency and consistency by 
enjoining parallel actions in other courts until the underlying disputes have been 
resolved in a first court.  Given the multinational nature of many FRAND disputes, 
ASIs have been issued with increasing frequency, particularly by courts in the 
United States, to preclude the same issues from being simultaneously litigated 
before courts in other countries.   
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Although disputes concerning SEPs and contractual FRAND commitments 
are global in their reach, any national court decision on those issues will 
necessarily have to decide questions implicating the national law interests of other 
countries, including patent and contractual rights.  But without the enforceability of 
ASIs, any such conflicts of law or contractual interpretation would result only in 
national law determinations that are impracticable or impossible to enforce, and in 
punitive national sanctions in the issuing jurisdictions for violating ASI terms 
(including terms prohibiting the filing of foreign judicial actions to seek anti-ASI 
orders).  Until a new worldwide system for addressing these problems is 
developed, ASIs will reduce, rather than exacerbate, the inevitable worldwide 
conflicts over national interests in contract interpretation and patent rights. 
This case presents an opportunity to ensure that a foreign court’s FRAND-
related ASI is given the same deference expected of an analogous ASI issued by a 
U.S. court.  The foreign ASI comes from the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court, 
Hubei Province (the “Chinese Court”), which Samsung has asked to set global 
FRAND licensing rates consistent with Ericsson’s contractual obligations for its 
worldwide SEPs.  The Chinese Court’s ASI precludes Ericsson from initiating 
parallel litigation in other jurisdictions seeking either a FRAND adjudication or 
asserting infringement of those SEPs.  Yet, Ericsson has done just that.  
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An English-language translation of the ASI decision indicates not only that 
the Chinese Court generally analyzed Samsung’s ASI request in a manner similar 
to that of U.S. courts, but also that the ASI would have satisfied the standards that 
U.S. courts use when issuing ASIs.  See Appx342-354.  The Chinese Court 
expressly issued the ASI to ability to resolve the global dispute between the 
parties, recognizing that if Ericsson were able to royalty adjudications in other 
jurisdictions, they could be inconsistent with a decision in the Chinese action.  See 
Appx347-348, Appx352-353.  The Chinese Court also recognized that the 
availability of such relief was subordinate to Ericsson’s contractual FRAND 
commitments.  Appx350-351.  And, the Chinese Court considered the effects on 
“the international civil order” before enjoining Ericsson from initiating any 
duplicative, parallel litigation.  Appx351-352.  These are the very issues 
considered by U.S. courts weighing a requested ASI. 
However, upon motion from Ericsson, the District Court in this case issued a 
preliminary injunction against Samsung – an anti-anti-suit injunction (AASI) 
precluding it from enforcing the Chinese Court’s ASI.  Appx1-16.  The District 
Court’s injunction permits Ericsson both to seek a FRAND determination and to 
bring infringement claims against Samsung before the U.S. courts, while 
effectively precluding Samsung from having the Chinese Court determine a global 
FRAND royalty rate that encompasses the same U.S. SEPs that Ericsson has 
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asserted in the present action.  Appx15.  In other words, the preliminary injunction 
frustrates the Chinese Court’s ASI and its ability to resolve the global contractual 
case before it.   
The District Court’s injunction was counterproductive as a matter of policy 
and presents a prime example of the slippery slope facing FRAND litigants:  if one 
court can issue an AASI, rejecting an ASI validly issued in another jurisdiction, 
then parties may feel the need to seek another layer of protection against 
duplicative proceedings:  an anti-anti-anti-suit injunction (AAASI), to preclude 
others from attempting to overturn an ASI in parallel litigation.  This is no mere 
hypothetical:  “[t]he AAASI is a rare but not unknown procedural mechanism, and 
has recently emerged in FRAND disputes.”1  Left unchecked, as one amicus has 
cautioned, it’s anti-suit injunctions “all the way down.”2  
In addition, respecting, and disrespecting, foreign ASIs in FRAND disputes 
has serious implications for international comity, which courts recognize as a 
pertinent factor in ASI determinations.  If U.S. courts expect foreign legal systems 
                                                 
1 Jorge L. Contreras, “It’s Anti-Suit Injunctions All the Way Down: The Strange 
New Realities of International Litigation over Standards-Essential Patents,” 26(4) 
IP LITIGATOR 1, 7 (July/August 2020) (“Anti-Suit Injunctions”). 
2 Id. at 1. 
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to respect their own injunctions, it is difficult to see how that deference will be 
maintained if it is not reciprocal.   
To be clear, amici do not express any opinion as to the jurisdiction, 
capability, or procedures of the Chinese courts, including when resolving 
contractual FRAND disputes and setting worldwide royalty rates, particularly 
when the District Court’s patent expertise is well-known and respected.  But absent 
any form of international agreement or industry-wide arbitral forum for resolving 
global FRAND disputes (which some amici have previously proposed3), existing 
judicial systems should be permitted to exercise their legitimate authority, and the 
District Court’s AASI precludes that possibility. 
ARGUMENT 
The Chinese Court’s ASI was an appropriate exercise of its authority to 
protect its jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute and conformed with the ASI 
analysis conducted by U.S. courts.  Because the Chinese action will result in the 
setting of a global FRAND rate for Ericsson’s SEPs, it will necessarily dispose of 
Ericsson’s related claims in the present litigation.4  Despite this, the District Court 
                                                 
3 Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential 
Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701, 712, 738-755 (2019) (“Global Rate Setting”) 
(proposing “a non-governmental, global FRAND rate-setting tribunal”). 
4 To the extent Ericsson has brought claims against Samsung in this action that are 
unrelated to Ericsson’s contractual FRAND obligations, those claims can be heard 
without upsetting the Chinese Court’s jurisdiction by complying with the ASI, and 
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not only enjoined Samsung from enforcing the Chinese ASI, but issued its own 
injunction, which will prevent the parties from ensuring the resolution of their 
dispute in a single forum.  The District Court’s AASI should be overturned or 
vacated. 
I. LICENSING OF STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS IS 
NECESSARY FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
Technical standards, like those to which Ericsson’s SEP portfolio are 
directed, are developed, issued, and promulgated by multinational standards 
development organizations (SDOs).  Ericsson’s relevant patents in this case 
concern technology for the telecommunications industry – in particular, 4G and 5G 
standards for mobile data exchange – but standards reach and involve all aspects of 
technology.  Indeed, SDOs include such far-ranging groups as the “BluRay Disc 
Association,” the “Advanced Television Systems Committee,” the “Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers,” and the “Open Mobile Alliance.”5 
SDOs are comprised of firms operating in the relevant industry, and those 
firms often secure voluminous worldwide patent protection covering their 
                                                 
waiting to adjudicate them until after the Chinese Court has addressed dispositive, 
threshold issues. 
5 Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents using 
Declarations of Standard-Essential Patents, 27 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 504, 
508, 533 (2018) (identifying 23 different SDOs). 
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contributions.6  For instance, Ericsson’s complaint in this action notes that it has 
“been awarded more than fifty-four thousand patents worldwide.”  Appx423.  Of 
course, any company that develops technology necessary to practice a particular 
standard (a standards-essential patent, or SEP) could exert significant leverage on 
competitors once that standard is formally adopted.  To avoid those consequences, 
many SDOs require participating firms to license their SEPs on terms that are “fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND).  The FRAND commitment reflects 
a contractual commitment between the SEP holder and the SDO.  See generally 
TCL Comm’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonakietbolaget LM Ericsson, 943 F.3d 
1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (discussing Ericsson’s FRAND obligations regarding 
telecommunications SEPs); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 
1231 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 
876-77 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing Motorola’s SEP commitment).   
Thus, like patent protection itself, the standards system involves a trade-off:  
firms may opt to have their proprietary technologies incorporated into industry 
standards, but doing so requires accepting contractual encumbrances on their 
relevant SEPs. 
                                                 
6 See id. at 508, 520-21 (2018) (“we have identified 139,620 unique patents 
belonging to 38,803 different patent families” that have been designated SEPs). 
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A. With Few Benchmarks for FRAND Rates, SEP Disputes Often 
Require Sprawling, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation 
Despite the primacy of these FRAND commitments in developing 
technological standards, there is little consensus for determining what royalty rates 
are “fair” or “reasonable,” especially with so many SEPs required to practice a 
single standard.  The analysis is further complicated when, as here, both 
negotiating parties may hold SEPs pursuant to a particular standard, adding the 
specter of mandatory cross-licensing.  This complexity may be why, far from 
defining FRAND terms, SDOs often disclaim any role in setting SEP royalties.7  
As a result, when parties cannot agree on a FRAND license, there is typically no 
alternative to costly, expansive litigation, which may involve contract, antitrust, 
and patent claims and counterclaims between large, sophisticated entities.   
Moreover, because SEP holders often hold patents in numerous jurisdictions 
– and because national courts typically only resolve disputes arising under their 
own patent laws and involving their own national patents8 – where parties cannot 
                                                 
7 Global Rate Setting, supra n. 3, at 705.  (“No SDO defines, even broadly, how to 
calculate royalty rates that are FRAND, and many SDOs expressly disclaim any 
role in establishing, interpreting, or adjudicating FRAND royalty rates.”). 
8 Jorge L. Contreras, The New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-Suit 
Injunctions and the Global Race to the Bottom In Disputes Over Standards-
Essential Patents, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 251, 255 (2019) (“The New 
Extraterritoriality”) (“[N]ational courts have seldom sought to reform, or create, 
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agree on a royalty rate for SEPs, they will not simply litigate their dispute in one 
forum, but on several fronts across the world.   For instance, in sprawling global 
litigation involving smartphone SEPs, Apple and Samsung sued each other in at 
least ten jurisdictions across three continents.9  Likewise, after purchasing a 
portfolio including several telecommunications SEPs, Vringo, Inc. sued 
smartphone manufacturer ZTE for patent infringement “in Australia, Brazil, 
France, Germany, India, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, perhaps among other places.”  Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14-
cv-4988-LAK, 2015 WL 3498634, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 3, 2015). 
Not only is such parallel litigation duplicative, but, as an amicus has noted, it 
renders impossible any hope of consistency in royalty determinations:  “there are 
more than a dozen points of serious divergence among courts and other 
adjudicatory bodies with respect to the methods of calculating FRAND royalty 
rates.”10  Even different courts within the same jurisdiction often use different 
methodologies to reach different conclusions about the same patents.11  Given this 
                                                 
private contractual arrangements that extend beyond their national borders and 
involve patents over which they otherwise lack adjudicatory power.”).  
9 Global Rate Setting, supra n.3, at 723. 
10 Id. at 707-08. 
11 Id. at 708. 
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lack of a generally-accepted framework, litigants and district courts must craft their 
own means of calculating an appropriate royalty rate, compounding the risk of 
inconsistency.  For instance, in TCL, the two parties “proposed different FRAND 
rates based on different methodologies” – both of which were rejected by the 
district court, which instead “devised its own” calculation of an appropriate royalty 
rate.  943 F.3d at 1363, 1368-70. 
The current situation only serves to further uncertainty in the marketplace, as 
parties lack a clear benchmark to determine the reasonableness of SEP licenses 
offered in private negotiations.   
B. Courts Have Increasingly Issued ASIs in FRAND Cases to Avoid 
Duplicative Litigation 
In light of the increasing complexity, expense, and inefficiency of 
simultaneously adjudicating similar issues in different jurisdictions, courts 
adjudicating FRAND cases have breathed new life into the ASI as a procedural 
mechanism to limit parallel litigation.12  In fact, it is the U.S. courts that have 
recently popularized the use of ASIs in of FRAND disputes.13  When proper, ASIs 
can ensure that issues are resolved by one court before they are litigated elsewhere, 
containing litigation costs and reducing the risk of inconsistent results.   
                                                 
12 Anti-Suit Injunctions, supra n.1, at 2-5. 
13 See The New Extraterritoriality, supra n.3, at 265-67. 
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The ASI dates back to fifteenth-century England, and its initial use was 
domestic, aimed at avoiding duplicative litigation in multiple different court 
systems within the nation.14  The use of ASIs by U.S. courts to limit foreign 
litigation dates back more than a century; in one of the earliest such decisions, a 
federal district court in California enjoined duplicative English proceedings that 
commenced later.  See Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 86 F. 984, 994, 999 (C.C.S.D. 
1898).  That court’s reasoning is echoed in more contemporary decisions:  because 
the U.S. action was duplicative of the English one, the district court had the 
authority to protect its jurisdiction to avoid cumulative proceedings.  “The 
proposition that the court which first acquires jurisdiction of a cause and of the 
parties thereto will hold and maintain it, in order to settle and end the controversy, 
does not admit of question.  From the views expressed, it results that the injunction 
asked for should be granted, and it is so ordered.”  Id. at 999. 
U.S. courts analyze various factors in determining whether to issue an ASI, 
but two prominent analyses are those set forth in In re Unterweser Reederei, 428 
F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Unterweser”) and E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina 
Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Gallo”).   
                                                 
14 George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 
28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 593-94 (1990). 
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In Unterweser, the Fifth Circuit set out four instances that may justify an 
ASI:  where foreign litigation would “(1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the 
injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court’s in rem or 
quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (4) where the proceedings prejudice other equitable 
considerations.”  428 F.3d at 890.   
The Ninth Circuit set forth a similar but more comprehensive test in Gallo: 
“the first step… is to determine whether or not the parties and the issues are the 
same, and whether or not the first action is dispositive of the action to be 
enjoined”; the second is to consider whether any of the Unterweser factors have 
been met, and the third is to assess whether the ASI’s “impact on comity is 
tolerable.”  Id. at 991-92, 994-95 (citations and quotations omitted).   
In practice, however, ASI determinations appear to rise and fall on a single 
factor:  whether the local action will be dispositive of the foreign action.15  Indeed, 
even where the two actions implicate different issues of fact or law, U.S. courts 
have issued ASIs where resolution of the U.S. case would resolve threshold 
matters of concurrent litigation in another jurisdiction.16   The Ninth Circuit has 
explained that this is the true focus of the “same issues” prong, which considers 
                                                 
15 The New Extraterritoriality, supra n.8, at 267-278 (collecting and summarizing 
cases). 
16 Id. at 277-78. 
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“whether the issues are the same not in a technical or formal sense, but in the sense 
that all the issues in the foreign action can be resolved in the local action.”  
Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 882-83 (quotation omitted).  
In recent SEP cases, U.S. courts have considered ASIs to prevent parties 
from pursuing actions in Chinese and other foreign courts. For instance, in Vringo, 
2015 WL 3498634, at *11, the district court denied Vringo’s motion for an ASI 
because the resolution of the U.S. action “would not necessarily foreclose” the 
parallel action in a Chinese court.  In contrast, in another U.S. case, Samsung’s 
motion for an ASI in the U.S. was granted when the district court recognized that 
the litigation at bar, a contractual dispute implicating whether Huawei was entitled 
to injunctive relief for infringement of its SEPs, was “dispositive of Huawei’s 
Chinese action” seeking such injunctions, because “the availability of injunctive 
relief for each party’s SEPs depends on the breach of contract claims.”  Huawei 
Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No.3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 WL 1784065, at 
*6-8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018). 
In short, U.S. courts have frequently issued ASIs to protect their jurisdiction, 
including over FRAND cases that have the potential to resolve global disputes 
between the litigants – the very reason for the development of this important 
procedural mechanism in the context of multinational SEP litigation. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS 
COUNTER TO PUBLIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COMITY 
In furtherance of many of the same principles discussed above, the Chinese 
Court in the instant case issued an ASI precluding Ericsson from initiating parallel 
litigation while it determined a worldwide FRAND license rate for Ericsson’s 
relevant global SEP portfolio.  Appx342-354.  The Chinese Court applied 
reasoning to its issuance that was comparable to that applied by U.S. courts in 
similar cases and, as in the U.S., Ericsson maintains a right to object to the 
issuance of the ASI.  See Appx354.17   
To be clear, amici do not express any opinion as to the Chinese Court’s 
authority to set global FRAND rates, or the procedural or substantive processes 
and methodologies exercised by that court in resolving the parties’ dispute, 
including the breadth of the ASI it issued.  Regardless, that ASI was a legitimate 
exercise of the Chinese Court’s jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ worldwide 
dispute, and it applied the factors applied by U.S. courts.  As the Chinese Court 
held, its ASI “will not only provide [a] way out for the disputes that the parties 
have failed to resolve after multiple rounds of negotiations, but also help to resolve 
the disputes in a package. It can also eliminate judicial litigation and jurisdiction 
                                                 
17 Amici understand that Ericsson has exercised such right.  See Appellants’ 
Opening Brief, D.I. 16, at 22. 
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conflicts caused by multiple lawsuits between the [parties] in different countries or 
regions to the greatest extent.”  Appx351-352. 
The District Court counteracted those efforts to resolve the dispute in a 
single forum by issuing an AASI enjoining Samsung from enforcing the ASI.  
While the District Court noted that “Ericsson is not seeking an anti-suit injunction 
to prevent the Chinese Action from proceeding,” Appx7, the District Court’s 
preliminary injunction may effectively provide such relief by enabling the District 
Court to establish FRAND rates that are inconsistent with those established by the 
Chinese Court. 
A. The Chinese Court’s ASI Appropriately Protected Its Jurisdiction 
to Resolve a Global Dispute 
Having asserted its jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute, the Chinese Court 
issued an ASI to prevent wasteful and duplicative parallel litigation in other fora.  
See Appx351 (noting that the ASI “will help ensure the proceeding of this case and 
the enforcement of the judgment”).  Of paramount concern, amici believe that it is 
inappropriate for U.S. courts to enjoin parallel litigation in China and other 
jurisdictions, while failing to respect ASIs ordered by those same foreign courts in 
accordance with their own legal standards, especially where, as here, they overlap 
considerably with the analysis undertaken by U.S. courts. 
Because the Chinese Court has indicated that it will determine a worldwide 
FRAND licensing rate for Ericsson’s SEPs, Appx346-347, there is no need for 
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Ericsson to do what it has done here:  hale Samsung into court in the United States 
(or in any other jurisdiction) asserting infringement of some of those very same 
patents, and ask the District Court (and this Court) to set a potentially different 
quantum of damages to compensate Ericsson for Samsung’s use of those SEPs.  
Ericsson has initiated this action despite the Chinese Court’s ASI specifically 
enjoining it from, inter alia, “requesting any courts either in China or other 
countries and regions to adjudicate the licensing terms (including the royalty rate) 
or royalty amount in terms of the [ ] SEPs involved in this Case,” and from 
“initiating any legal proceedings requesting to determine whether [Samsung] have 
fulfilled their FRAND obligations in terms of the present negotiations for licensing 
the [ ] SEPs involved in this case.”  Appx3-5.  The present action implicates both 
of these questions.  Because the Chinese Court’s ASI effectuates the core 
principles of certainty and efficiency and was appropriate under both the Gallo and 
Unterweser tests (the latter of which was applied by the District Court, see Appx8-
12), and because the District Court’s AASI is contrary to international comity, the 
ASI should be upheld, and the preliminary injunction should be reversed.   
1. The Chinese Action Is Dispositive of the Claims in the U.S. 
Litigation 
“The threshold consideration for a foreign anti-suit injunction is ‘whether or 
not the parties and the issues are the same’ in both the domestic and foreign 
actions, ‘and whether or not the first action is dispositive of the action to be 
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enjoined.”  Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 882 (quoting Gallo, 446 F.3d at 991).  Both of 
these prongs were met when the Chinese Court issued its ASI.  This action and the 
Chinese Action concern the same parties, the same SEPs, and the same contractual 
FRAND commitments, and ask for judicial intervention in determining how much 
Samsung may have to pay Ericsson for its use of those SEPs.  As such, the 
FRAND determination by the Chinese Court, and the subsequent license that 
Ericsson is obligated to grant to Samsung, will necessarily dispose of the present 
U.S. action. 
Despite these circumstances, the District Court ruled that the two cases “may 
be factually similar but involve very separate legal questions.”   Appx11. The 
District Court reasoned that “Samsung asks the Wuhan Court to determine the 
global licensing terms, including the FRAND royalty rates applicable for 
Samsung’s communication products implementing all of Ericsson’s 4G and 5G 
SEPs.  Ericsson, on the other hand, asks this Court to look at the parties’ pre-suit 
negotiation conduct” and consider whether Samsung was indeed a willing FRAND 
licensee of Ericsson’s SEPs.  Appx11-12.  But this is a distinction without a 
difference.  These facially-disparate “separate legal questions” rise and fall 
together, as the Chinese Court recognized in specifically enjoining Ericsson from 
initiating proceedings alleging misconduct by Samsung in the parties’ pre-suit 
negotiations.  Indeed, the Chinese Court expressly noted that if Ericsson were to 
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challenge such conduct in a parallel litigation – as it has done here – “it will lead to 
an overlap or conflicts between the scope of trial and outcomes in earlier filed case 
and the later ones.”  Appx348. 
In its Complaint, Ericsson alleges that Samsung offered unreasonably low, 
non-FRAND royalty rates for its SEP portfolio.  Appx434-436.  Thus, in 
adjudicating that claim, the District Court will be required to answer the same 
threshold question as the Chinese Court:  what is a proper FRAND rate for the 
relevant patents?  Compare Appx346 (Samsung requested “the court to determine, 
based on FRAND principle, the global license conditions, including royalty rates, 
of [Ericsson’s] 4G and 5G SEPs”) (emphasis added) with TCL Comm’n Tech. 
Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. 2:15-cv-2370-JVS, 2018 
WL 4488286, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sep.14, 2018) rev’d in part on other grounds 943 
F.3d 1360 (“The court must determine whether … Ericsson’s final offers before 
litigation [ ] satisfy FRAND.  If they [do] not, the Court must determine what 
terms are material to a FRAND license, and then supply the FRAND terms.”) 
(emphasis added).   
Should the Chinese Court determine a FRAND royalty rate that substantially 
exceeds Samsung’s offers during the parties’ negotiations, then Ericsson would be 
able to proceed with its claim that Samsung was “only willing to pay Ericsson a 
rate for Ericsson’s Essential Patents that was significantly below FRAND.”  
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Appx435.  Alternatively, if the Chinese Court’s global FRAND determination 
aligns more closely with Samsung’s pre-litigation position, then Ericsson’s claims 
will fail.  Either possibility supports the Chinese Court’s ASI, as allowing the 
Chinese Court first to determine an appropriate FRAND rate will avoid cumulative 
litigation and the risk of inconsistent results.  Contrary to the District Court’s 
determination, U.S. courts recognize that “[t]he issues need not be precisely and 
verbally identical” in order to justify an ASI, provided that the second action be 
resolved by a ruling in the first. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 883 (internal quotation 
omitted).  As set forth above, that is the case at bar.   
Ericsson’s narrow framing of the U.S. litigation is also suspect.  Ericsson has 
not merely alleged that Samsung was not willing to pay FRAND royalty rates, but 
also brings infringement claims as to several of its U.S. SEPs covering 4G and 5G 
technology pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285, see Appx436-440, Appx480-
481 – claims that would necessarily be resolved by any global license entered into 
by the parties following the Chinese Court’s determination of an appropriate 
FRAND royalty rate.  Indeed, the “contractual umbrella” of FRAND commitments 
encompasses these infringement allegations.   Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 883.  To that 
end, some courts have even held that an SEP holder is contractually barred from 
asserting infringement claims against a willing licensee; judicial adjudication of an 
appropriate FRAND rate is the only remedy available in these circumstances.  
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Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 WL 3966944, 
at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2017).  This, too, supports the ASI.   
Given these circumstances, the Chinese Court’s ASI effectively mirrors the 
one issued by the district court in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F.Supp. 
2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872.  There, the district court 
recognized that a U.S. action seeking, inter alia, the setting of FRAND terms for 
Microsoft’s license of Motorola’s SEPs, would be dispositive of Motorola’s 
infringement claims in German court and thus the issues were effectively the same 
across the two jurisdictions.  Id. at 1098-1100.  Likewise, because in this case the 
parties and issues are the same between both the Chinese action and the present 
litigation, and the Chinese action would be dispositive of Ericsson’s claims, the 
first Gallo factor supports the ASI. 
2. The ASI Satisfies at Least One Unterweser Factor  
The Chinese Court’s ASI was also proper under U.S. law because the 
“foreign litigation” – i.e., the present U.S. action – both frustrated a policy of the 
Chinese courts and because it is vexatious and oppressive to Samsung.  The 
Chinese courts have seemingly adopted a policy favoring resolution of worldwide 
FRAND disputes, rather than piecemeal patent litigation in various jurisdictions.18  
                                                 
18 Yang Yu and Jorge L. Contreras, Will China’s New Anti-Suit Injunctions Shift 
the Balance of Global FRAND Litigation?, UNIV. UTAH COLL. OF L. RES. PAPER 
NO. 403, at 4-5 (Dec. 1, 2020) (“China has clearly joined the international race to 
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Whatever the merits of this policy may be, it cannot be denied that the Chinese 
courts are within their rights to seek to resolve global contractual FRAND disputes 
on their own terms.  Notably, the U.S. courts have likewise held “that court 
policies against avoiding inconsistent judgments … [are] sufficient to satisfy this 
step.”  Microsoft, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.  Thus, in Microsoft, the court’s 
“concerns against inconsistent judgments,” id., satisfied Unterweser and merited 
an ASI.  The Chinese Court justified its ASI on precisely these grounds.  See 
Appx348 (if Ericsson files parallel actions in other courts, “it will lead to an 
overlap or conflicts between the scope of trial and outcomes of this earlier filed 
case and the later ones, and further result in difficulties in the enforcement of the 
judgment rendered by this Court”). 
Similarly, the present action is vexatious or oppressive to Samsung because 
it “compromis[es] the [Chinese] court’s ability to reach a just result in the case 
before it.”  Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 886.  As discussed in Section II.B, infra, the 
preliminary injunction issued by the District Court does not merely prevent 
enforcement of the Chinese Court’s ASI in this action, but it also strips from the 
Chinese Court jurisdiction regarding Ericsson’s U.S. patents, without which a 
global FRAND determination is impossible.  See Appx15.  Indeed, as the Chinese 
                                                 
be the jurisdiction of choice for determining FRAND royalty rates in global 
disputes involving standard-essential patents.”).  
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Court recognized, parallel litigations such as the case at bar “intervene in the 
adjudication of the [Chinese] case and thus render the judgment of the [Chinese] 
case hard to enforce.”  Appx344-345.  Absent the Chinese Court’s ability to craft 
global relief, Ericsson might consider itself free to file suit for infringement not 
only in the United States, as it has done, but in each and every jurisdiction in which 
it holds national patents, inviting the same sprawling, worldwide litigation that the 
Chinese Court’s ASI sought to prevent.   
In granting the preliminary injunction, the District Court seemingly did not 
to consider these consequences, instead ruling that “[t]he public interest strongly 
supports this Court’s continued exercise of its jurisdiction,” and that “[a]llowing 
Samsung to enjoin Ericsson from asking this Court to adjudicate legally cognizable 
claims under United States law would frustrate this Court’s compelling interest in 
ensuring that litigation within its legitimate jurisdiction proceed in this forum.”  
Appx8.  But such a determination, taken to its logical conclusion, would hold that 
no ASI affecting any U.S. court could ever be appropriate, because every court 
could rely on its own “compelling interest” in adjudicating claims arising under its 
jurisdiction.  The District Court essentially suggests that Article III courts need 
never comply with a foreign ASI,19 and its rationale equally provides foreign 
                                                 
19 See Appx8 (“The purpose of an Article III Court is to be an impartial adjudicator 
or cases and controversies within its lawfully conferred jurisdiction. To enforce the 
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courts a basis to reject valid, U.S.-issued ASIs.  This reasoning would only portend 
the precise type of wasteful, duplicative, and inconsistent litigation that the ASI 
was intended to prevent.  Public policy weighs in favor of allowing the Chinese 
action to first resolve threshold issues, particularly in view of considerations of 
international judicial reciprocity.  
Thus, as a matter of U.S. law, the Chinese Court’s ASI satisfied the second 
prong of the Gallo test, and the Unterweser analysis in its entirety.  
3. The ASI Has a Tolerable Impact on Comity—But the AASI 
Does Not 
The District Court, applying Fifth Circuit law, recognized that “notions of 
comity do not wholly dominate the analysis to the exclusion of these other 
concerns.”  Appx6, citing Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 890.  As discussed above, those 
“other concerns” support the Chinese Court’s ASI.  In any event, the ASI also 
meets this prong, in no small part because the Chinese action was filed first.20  See 
Huawei, 2018 WL 1784065, at *12 (where U.S. action preceded foreign litigation, 
                                                 
ASI in this case would frustrate the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal 
courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”) (citations and quotations omitted). 
20 The Chinese Court also conducted a thorough analysis as to whether the ASI 
would “harm the public interest and the international civil litigation order,” 
determining that it would not; rather, the ASI would ensure a global resolution of 
the parties’ dispute.  Appx351-352. 
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“if only by one day[,] enjoining the foreign action would not intolerably impact 
comity”).   
Moreover, the different legal procedures between the Chinese and U.S. 
courts do not implicate comity concerns that justify the District Court’s AASI.  As 
the Ninth Circuit recognized: 
[T]he mere fact that different jurisdictions answer the same 
legal question differently does not, without more, generate an 
intolerable comity problem.  If that were the case, then there 
could virtually never be a foreign anti-suit injunction: Parallel 
proceedings in different jurisdictions would have to be 
permitted to proceed any time the two jurisdictions had 
different rules of law, which is almost always the case. 
Motorola, 696 F.3d at 888.  In fact, it is the District Court’s AASI that implicates 
comity concerns; as discussed supra, its reasoning provides foreign courts equal 
basis to reject ASIs issued by U.S. courts.  It should not be ignored that many such 
ASIs have been directed at enjoining parallel Chinese proceedings.21  See, e.g., 
Vringo, 2015 WL 3498634 (seeking ASI to enjoin proceedings before court in 
Shenzhen, China); Huawei, 2018 WL 1784065 (same).  If a Chinese ASI will not 
be honored by U.S. courts, Chinese courts may well respond in kind, denying 
                                                 
21 The New Extraterritoriality, supra n.8, at 277-78.  Of the six U.S. FRAND cases 
in which an ASI was sought prior to 2020, five were aimed at enjoining parallel 
litigation in China.  Id. 
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litigants in both jurisdictions streamlined resolution of their disputes and 
exacerbating the problem amici seek to solve.   
B. The District Court’s AASI May Itself Operate as an ASI, 
Preventing the Chinese Court from Adjudicating Its Case 
The District Court specifically noted that “Ericsson is not seeking an anti-
suit injunction to prevent the Chinese Action from proceeding.”  Appx7.  It does 
not appear that the District Court intended to affect the jurisdiction of the Chinese 
Court; indeed, it expressly noted that it “is not instructing Samsung that it cannot 
continue to prosecute its claims in the Wuhan Court nor is this Court seeking to 
enjoin the furtherance of that proceeding.”  Appx13.  Rather, the District Court 
“believe[d] it must act for the targeted purpose of allowing both suits to proceed 
without interference.”  (Id.)  The District Court recognized that Ericsson’s 
proposed relief was “too broad,” and declined to “insert itself into matters of 
Chinese law or civil procedure.”  Appx14.  Despite these caveats, the relief it 
fashioned may frustrate the Chinese Court’s ability to fully adjudicate Samsung’s 
case before it.  Even if Samsung is not permitted to enforce the Chinese ASI in 
U.S. courts, the District Court’s AASI is overbroad, and merits vacatur.   
In particular, the District Court enjoined Samsung from taking any action in 
the Chinese action “that would interfere with any other cause of action before this 
Court,” or “that would deprive Ericsson, Inc. or all of its corporate parents, 
subsidiaries, and affiliates of their rights to assert the full scope of their U.S. patent 
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rights before any Article III Court, customs office, or administrative agency in the 
United States.”  Appx15.  At face value, these orders arguably would preclude 
Samsung from asking the Chinese Court to set global FRAND terms that include a 
license to Ericsson’s U.S. SEPs – including those asserted in this litigation – and 
could significantly erode the Chinese Court’s jurisdiction.   Indeed, the District 
Court’s assertion that “[t]he [Chinese] Court can continue to adjudicate the claims 
that Samsung has brought before it” does not reflect the worldwide nature of 
Ericsson’s FRAND commitment, nor the corresponding relief that court is capable 
of issuing; as in Microsoft, Ericsson’s obligation constitutes a “contractual 
umbrella over [its] patent claims” that requires adjudication in that forum.  696 
F.3d at 883 (issuing ASI enjoining German proceeding involving German patent 
claims).   
Notably, while the Chinese Court enjoined Ericsson – the party that made 
the relevant contractual commitment pursuant to its SEP obligations – the District 
Court’s injunction precludes Samsung from seeking comprehensive relief in China.  
“This distinction is legally significant.”  Apple, 2017 WL 3966944, at *10 (denying 
motion for ASI).  “By striking this bargain … [Ericsson] willingly limited itself to 
one of two alternatives:  either make [Samsung], and all other willing licensees, a 
[F]RAND offer through bilateral negotiation or after adjudication by the courts.”  
Id.  “In other words, by making a FRAND commitment, [Ericsson] surrendered its 
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right to seek infringement actions against a willing licensee.”  Id.  Samsung 
appears to be such a willing licensee, and its actions in China are in furtherance of 
Ericsson’s contractual obligation.  The District Court inverted this analysis, and, as 
it pertains to the relevant U.S. SEPs, exclusively allowed Ericsson to pursue its 
infringement action. 
In short, the District Court’s AASI may essentially operate as an ASI, 
divesting from the Chinese court any jurisdiction pertaining to Ericsson’s license 
of U.S. patents included in its global portfolio.  The preliminary injunction should 
be overturned as overly broad, as it could deny the parties the judicial efficiency of 
a single judicial procedure to resolve their contractual matter.   
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court should reverse the District Court’s 
preliminary injunction and affirm the Chinese Court’s ASI, or, in the alternative, 
vacate the preliminary injunction and remand for entry of an AASI that does not 
potentially interfere with the Chinese Court’s ability to resolve the parties’ 
contractual dispute by setting a global FRAND rate that includes a license to 
Ericsson’s relevant U.S. SEPs. 
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